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LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE:
THE CASE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Francis X. Shen
Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being introduced in
legal contexts, and neurolaw scholarship is correspondingly on the rise.
Yet absent from neurolaw research to date are extended examinations
of neuroscience in legislative domains. This Article begins to fill that
gap with a focus on the illustrative case of neuroscience and juvenile
justice in state legislatures. Such examination reveals distinctions
between lab neuroscience, lobbyist neuroscience, and legislator
neuroscience. As neuroscience narratives are constructed in the policy
stream, normative questions arise. Without courtroom evidentiary rules
to guide the use of neuroscience in legislatures, these questions are
complicated. For instance, to what extent should lobbyists and
legislators adhere to the complexities and caveats of laboratory
science? How much should lawmakers simplify and reformulate the
scientific findings to achieve desired policy ends?
The Article argues that the construction of neuroscience
narratives is necessary and desirable, but if the narratives diverge too
greatly from actual research findings, they may ultimately undermine
the efficacy of the neuroscience in policymaking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court juvenile justice cases examined in this
symposium issue—Miller v. Alabama,1 Graham v. Florida,2 and
Roper v. Simmons3—are notable both for their substantive holdings,
and for the neuroscience research findings that appear in many of the
amici briefs and some of the opinions.4 My goal in this Article is to
add to that conversation by suggesting that our attention—both for
purposes of understanding the future of juvenile justice policy, and
for understanding how neuroscience may play a role in shaping that
future—should be placed on the legislative as well as the judicial
branch.
Why examine legislative use of neuroscience? Supreme Court
Justice Elena Kagan provides us with an answer. During a
question-and-answer session in 2012 Justice Kagan was asked about
her opinion on juvenile transfer policies, and she replied: “[T]hat’s
for a legislature to do . . . . [W]hat makes for good criminal justice
policy[?] . . . I view that as a very different question than the
questions that I’m answering and a different role to be performed
than the role I have.”5 Justice Kagan reminds us that as important as
Miller, Graham, and Roper are for setting limits on legislative
action, much of detailed policymaking for juvenile justice remains in
the domain of legislators, not judges. It is thus important that we
investigate how these individuals are legislating neuroscience.
How legislators use or ignore scientific evidence has been
explored in domains such as environmental policymaking.6 But such
inquiries have not been made in the context of neuroscience, and we
have an underdeveloped sense of how neuroscience is used by
legislatures. In addition, we lack an accepted normative framework
by which we should evaluate that use of neuroscience. Unlike
courtroom use, where we can employ evidentiary standards such as
1. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4. For an excellent summary of these cases in historical perspective, see Elizabeth S. Scott,
Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535
(2013); Elizabeth S. Scott, “Children Are Different”: Constitutional Values and Justice Policy,
11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71 (2013).
5. Elena Kagan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Remarks at the University of Richmond
School of Law (Sept. 20, 2012) (emphasis added).
6. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
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those in the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,7 in legislatures there are few restrictions on what
can be considered as part of the policymaking process. Indeed, it is
often a high-profile focusing event, not a body of scientific research,
that spurs policymakers into action.
Using the illustrative case of juvenile justice and focusing on
state legislatures, this Article begins to explore how neuroscience is
being used in the statehouse. I find that juvenile justice policy
discussion in state legislatures includes mention of adolescent brain
science. It is unclear what effect this science has on policymaking,
but brain science is being presented at legislative hearings, cited by
legislators, and integrated into some new laws. I also find, however,
that how neuroscience is discussed by advocates in the policy stream
differs, in important ways, from what the science itself says. Legal
advocates seem to be more aggressive and categorical in their use of
the science, presumably because they find this more persuasive to
achieve their desired ends.
I argue that we need to carefully consider the framework by
which we evaluate such “neuroscience narratives.” If the science
narrative used in legislatures achieves a socially desirable outcome,
is it a “mis-use” of the science, to be criticized? Or is it a good use of
the science, to be encouraged? To what extent should the juvenile
justice policy arguments in legislatures rely upon brain science? In
answering such questions, I suggest that we ought to keep in mind
the possibility that, should neuroscience make sufficient progress in
assessing individual differences among juveniles, the present
alignment of neuroscience research with juvenile justice reformers
may be strained.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the recent
rise of law and neuroscience, and reviews literature on the
intersection of brain science and juvenile justice. Part II examines
how legislatures, and the advocacy groups lobbying those
legislatures, have incorporated brain science in their deliberations.
Part III shifts focus specifically to post-Miller legislative activity,
with a brief discussion of how brain science is playing a role. Part IV
considers more broadly how we ought to understand, and critique,
neuroscience in the legislature. Part V concludes.
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE

Spring 2013]

9/9/2014 11:46 AM

LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE

989

II. ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE & THE COURTS
A. The Rise of Neurolaw8
Neuroscience is being integrated into U.S. law and policy in a
variety of ways.9 Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly, if still
rarely, seen in courtrooms.10 Two juvenile public defenders in
Virginia report that they use brain science “all the time on a variety
of issues—transfer/certification, correctional versus non-correctional
sentences, Miranda, accomplice liability, applicability of adult
sentencing guidelines . . . . Basically, we try to work it in whenever
we can.”11 Brain science can also be disseminated in more subtle
ways. For instance, in the Minnesota Department of Public Safety’s
summary guide of juvenile diversion programs, there is an explicit
connection made between adolescent brain science and the efficacy
of diversion.12
Other indicators also suggest growth: scholarship at the
intersection of law and neuroscience is growing rapidly,13 an

8. This subsection is based on a similar subsection in Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience,
Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 653, 660–664 (2013).
9. For lengthier and more comprehensive introductions to neurolaw, see BRENT GARLAND,
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (2004); Owen D.
Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL
NEUROLAW (Tade Spranger ed., 2011); LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
(Michael Freeman ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010); LAW, MIND AND BRAIN (Michael Freeman &
Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009); Preface, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2012); NEUROIMAGING IN
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012);
Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom,
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly:
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1119 (2010); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive
Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2010); Henry T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner,
Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed.
2011); Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for
Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007).
10. See Jones & Shen, supra note 9, at 3504.
11. H. Ted Rubin, The Legal Defense of Juveniles: Struggling but Pushing Forward, 16 JUV.
JUST. UPDATE, June/July 2010, at 2.
12. DANA SWAYZE & DANETTE BUSKOVICK, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, MINNESOTA
JUVENILE DIVERSION: A SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE PRACTICES AND PROGRAMMING 50 (2012)
(“Adolescent brain development research shows that the portions of the brain that govern
reasoning and comprehending consequences are not fully developed in youth. As such, diversion
opportunities for youth are especially important given diminished reasoning capacity . . . .”).
13. Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging
Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 352 (2010).
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increasing number of students are being introduced to neurolaw,14
the first Law and Neuroscience textbook is being published,15
thousands of judges and lawyers are being exposed to neuroscience
through conferences and continuing legal education programs,16 and
multiple web sites are making neurolaw news available to the
interested public.17
Moreover, and of note, this area of research has seen
investments from foundations and government agencies.18 For
instance, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
invested $10 million in 2007 to start a Law and Neuroscience
Project,19 and in 2011 the Foundation renewed its commitment with
a $4.85 million dollar grant to sustain the Research Network on Law
and Neuroscience.20 These institutional commitments foster dialogue
and research, and send a strong signal that this is a field of great
possibility.
While some have predicted that neuroscience will fundamentally
change the law,21 there has been push-back to this claim.22 The field
has debated issues regarding criminal responsibility;23 free will;24
14. OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
(2014).
15. Id.
16. History: Phase I (2007–2011), MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. &
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/history.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
17. External Links, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE,
http://www.lawneuro.org/links.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
18. See JONES, SCHALL & SHEN, supra note 14.
19. New $10 Million MacArthur Project Integrates Law and Neuroscience, MACARTHUR
FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/new-10-million-macarthur
-project-integrates-law-and-neuroscience.
20. Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at Vanderbilt, MACARTHUR FOUND.
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.macfound.org/press/press-releases/law-and-neuroscience-networkexpands-at-vanderbilt; Amy Wolf, Landmark Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at
Vanderbilt, VANDERBILT UNIV. (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2011/08
/grant-will-expand-law-neuroscience-network/.
21. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775, 1775 (2004).
22. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837 (2011) [hereinafter Morse, Avoiding Irrational
NeuroLaw Exuberance]; Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) [hereinafter Morse, Brain
Overclaim]; Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and
Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1250 (2010).
23. See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1787 (2004). Legal scholar and psychologist Stephen
J. Morse argues that to conflate explanation with excuse is to commit a “fundamental psycholegal
error.” Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future of Personhood and Responsibility, in
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neuroethics;25 and many areas beyond criminal law.26 Legal scholar
Jennifer Drobac has argued, in part based on new neuroscience
findings, that the law ought to better empower teenagers in some
civil contexts.27 Similarly, legal scholars have explored ways in
which neuroscience can inform the legal regimes governing
adolescent medical decision making.28
Although attorneys do not routinely use brain-based evidence in
a large number of legal contexts, attorneys are using such evidence
more than they have in previous years. Structural brain imaging is a
standard part of an assessment of an individual known to have
experienced a traumatic brain injury (TBI).29 Positron Emission
Tomography (PET) and Single-Photon Emission Computed
Tomography (SPECT) have been used in a variety of criminal and
civil cases.30
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 113, 120 (Jeffrey Rosen &
Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) [hereinafter Morse, Neuroscience]; Morse, Avoiding Irrational
NeuroLaw Exuberance, supra note 22, at 846; Morse, Brain Overclaim, supra note 22, at 399;
see Greene & Cohen, supra note 21, at 1778; David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, 308 THE
ATLANTIC 112 (2011); see, e.g., DEBORAH W. DENNO, CHANGING LAW’S MIND: HOW
NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP US PUNISH CRIMINALS MORE FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY (Oxford
Univ. Press 2011); Nita Farahany & Hank Greely, Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal
Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183 (Nita
Farahany ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009); Eyal Aharoni et al., Can Neurological Evidence Help
Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 145 (2008); Shelley Batts, Brain Lesions and Their Implications in Criminal
Responsibility, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261 (2009); Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Neuropsychology of
Justifications and Excuses: Some Problematic Cases of Self-Defense, Duress, and Provocation,
50 JURIMETRICS J. 391 (2010).
24. CONSCIOUS WILL AND RESPONSIBILITY: A TRIBUTE TO BENJAMIN LIBET (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
25. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEUROETHICS (Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 2011).
26. See Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible Legal
and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN,
MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114 (Dana Found. & Brent Garland eds., 2004); Adam J.
Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011).
27. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, A Bee Line in the Wrong Direction: Science, Teenagers, and
the Sting to “The Age of Consent”, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 115 (2011).
28. Amanda C. Pustilnik & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Introduction: Adolescent Medical
Decision Making and the Law of the Horse, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2012)
(“Neuroscience can inform legal regimes relating to adolescent decision making, although it
cannot fully explain them, by substantiating and verifying, or negating, the ideas of difference on
which such policies currently rest.”).
29. Robert P. Granacher, Jr., Traumatic Brain Injury, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 43, 44 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012).
Functional imaging in traumatic brain injury cases is less common. Id. at 57.
30. Susan E. Rushing et al., PET and SPECT, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:
FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM, supra note 29, 3, 20–21.
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The effect of neuroscience on judicial and juror decision making
remains unknown. One view is that the “seductive allure” of
neuroscientific explanations, and in particular the allure of colorful
brain images, will be unduly persuasive.31 One experimental study
using state court judges as subjects concluded (in a non-adolescent
context) that judges significantly reduced their sentences for
psychopaths when provided with a neuroscientific explanation for
the psychopath’s behavior.32 But other experimental studies have
found null effects.33 Meanwhile, other reported data suggests that the
impact of neuroscience in courts has been minimal, with some now
warning about the seductive allure of the seductive allure
explanation.34 In short, while it is clear that the use of neuroscientific
evidence is on the rise, we cannot say with confidence what the
actual effects of such evidence will be.
B. Neurolaw and Juvenile Justice
Courts, practitioners, and scholars have observed the potential
implications of neuroscience for juvenile justice.35 The standard
31. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcu, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain Injury on
Insanity Defense, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 85, 85–97 (2008); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470–77
(2008).
31. Lisa G. Aspinwall et al., The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or
Decrease Judges’ Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 SCIENCE 846, 846 (2012).
32. Id.
33. N. J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 382 (2011); Michael J. Saks et al., The Impact of Neuroimages
in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 11 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2014).
34. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice, in 13 LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 258, supra note 9, 255, 269 (“Though the science has
been positively received by a small number of courts and judges, usually in the context of
sentencing, in no instance has it been outcome-determinative.”); Martha J. Farah & Cayce J.
Hook, The Seductive Allure of “Seductive Allure”, 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 88 (2013).
35. See Katherine H. Federle & Paul Skendelas, Thinking Like a Child: Legal Implications
of Recent Developments in Brain Research for Juvenile Offenders, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN
199 (Ashgate et al. eds., 2009); Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Abigail A. Baird et al., Juvenile
Neurolaw: When It’s Good It Is Very Good Indeed, and When It’s Bad It’s Horrid, 15 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL’Y 15 (2012); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and
the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Terry A. Maroney,
Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2010)
[hereinafter Maroney, After Graham]; Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain
Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009) [hereinafter Maroney, The False
Promise]. This Article focuses only on the criminal justice implications of brain science in the
legislature. As others have recognized and discussed, developmental neuroscience may also have
implications for the demarcation of children’s rights. See Catherine J. Ross, A Stable Paradigm:
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logic of most of these arguments typically is consistent with Justice
Kagan’s discussion in Miller:
Our decisions rested not only on common sense—on what
“any parent knows”—but on science and social science as
well . . . . [I]n Graham, we noted that “developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds”—for
example, in “parts of the brain involved in behavior
control.” We reasoned that those findings—of transient
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess
consequences—both lessened a child’s “moral culpability”
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and
neurological development occurs, his “deficiencies will be
reformed.”36
Most legal commentators have been supporters of this trend
toward the integration of neuroscience into legal and policy decision
making. Law professor Terry Maroney has tracked the contours of
these developments in a series of articles, summarizing the history
this way:
Scholars and advocates in the late 1990s . . . correctly
perceived that science and law were moving in opposite
directions: the former was solidifying around the view that
adolescents are different from adults in ways directly
relevant to their culpability and capacity for change, while
the latter was solidifying around the view that adolescents,
particularly older ones or those accused of very serious
crimes, ought to be treated like adults.37
Many commentators now believe that “[t]he research in brain
development has wide-ranging implications for juvenile
offenders . . . [and] raises questions about current concepts of
culpability, accountability and punishment, . . . transferring or

Revisiting Capacity, Vulnerability and the Rights Claims of Adolescents After Roper v. Simmons,
in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 183, 189–196 (Ashgate et al. eds., 2009). Developmental neuroscience
has also played a role in legislative debate over early child intervention. H.R. 2794, 112th Cong.
§ 4 (1) (2011) (noting in congressional findings that “research conclusively shows that children’s
experiences in the early years of life influence the developing brain and have a significant and
lasting impact upon their ability to succeed in school and in life”).
36. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2012) (citations omitted).
37. Maroney, supra note 34, at 258.

LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE

9/9/2014 11:46 AM

994

[Vol. 46:985

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

relinquishing jurisdiction to adult courts, and labelling [sic] minors
as sexual offenders or predators.”38
For instance, Katherine Hunt Federle and Paul Skendelas
suggest that such evidence “provides a neural basis for assuming that
teens are less blameworthy than adults for the commission of
criminal acts.”39 Later they write that “[t]he brain research provides
strong evidence that we should not hold minors as accountable as
adults because their brains are different and they do not have the
same decision-making capacity as adults.”40 And finally, the authors
suggest that “[t]he scientific research on brain development is
sufficiently compelling as to require us to reconsider our views on
juvenile punishment as it is morally wrong and scientifically
unsound to hold juveniles to the same degree of responsibility as
adults who commit similar offenses.”41
To be sure, scholars are not uniformly in support of these
positions. While many scientists and clinicians are in agreement, and
some are active in juvenile justice reform,42 not all share this
sentiment.43 On the law side, a prolific critic has been law professor
Stephen Morse.44 Morse has argued that “[t]he neuroscience
evidence in no way independently confirms that adolescents are less
responsible” than adults.45 Even if one assumes that the
38. Federle & Skendelas, supra note 35, at 199.
39. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 213.
41. Id. at 213–14.
42. H.B. 1994 and Juvenile Justice: Hearing Before the H. Democratic Policy Comm., 2012
Leg. 33–42 (Pa. 2012), available at www.pahouse.com/PolicyCommittee/documents/2012
/hdpc081512.pdf (exhibit in support of a statement by Rev. Dr. Roger L. Thomas, Co-Chair of
the Governor’s Pa. Comm. for the Analysis and Reform of Our Criminal Sys.).
43. Robert Epstein, The Myth of the Teen Brain, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, Apr. 2007,
57–63. Jay D. Aronson, Neuroscience and Juvenile Justice, 42 AKRON L. REV. 917, 928 (2009)
(“[T]here is nothing even approaching consensus within the scientific community that these brain
imaging studies ought to guide legal decision-making and public policy in the context of juvenile
justice.”).
44. See Morse, Neuroscience, supra note 23, at 120; Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw
Exuberance, supra note 22, at 837; Morse, Brain Overclaim, supra note 22, at 399. Stephen J.
Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome Redux: More Cognitive Jurotherapy Is Indicated, 31 LAW &
INEQ. 509 (2013). Others have similarly recognized that the future of neuroscience and law is not
necessarily a bright one. Abigail A. Baird et al., supra note 35, at 34 (“If used properly and
interpreted accurately, neuroscientific data could aid the courts just as much as data from DNA
methodologies have. However, if professionals misuse, grossly misinterpret or ‘stretch’ the
meaning of the data, neuroscience will end up sharing its history with eugenics.”).
45. Stephen J. Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neuroscience, in
NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33, 48 (Judy Illes ed.,
2005).
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neuroscientific data is valid, Morse suggests that the “neuroscience
evidence in no way independently confirms the adolescents are less
responsible.”46 In the context of juvenile justice, the message is that
even if the Court cited neuroscience studies, neuroscience is not
nearly as threatening or as transformative as some make it out to
be.47 In addition, there are a tremendous number of limitations and
cautions with current brain science techniques that must be
acknowledged.48
Similarly, legal scholar Emily Buss argues that “there is nothing
inherent about an adolescent’s blameworthiness however well we
understand the progress of their development, and it is up to the law,
not developmental science, to assign that blame.”49 When authors or
advocates suggest that neuroscience shows adolescents are less
blameworthy, this “improperly suggests that adolescents’
developmental status dictates their level of culpability and leaves no
room for independent legal (or moral) judgment.”50
Particularly challenging is that current science tells us reliably
about group average differences in brain development in age, but
cannot reliably tell us about the individual cognitive ability of a
particular juvenile in the criminal justice system.51 Neuroscience is
thus potentially informative—but still very much limited in what it
can presently offer to improve the adjudication of juvenile criminal
cases.52 But do limitations to courtroom use of neuroscience apply
46. Id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience,
in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES: LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 9, 529, 562 (“Neuroscience
has the potential to make internal contributions to legal doctrine and practice if the relation is
properly understood. For now, however, such contributions are modest at best and neuroscience
poses no genuine, radical challenges to concepts of personhood, responsibility, and
competence.”).
47. See Aharoni et al., supra note 23, at 156–59.
48. See Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the Perplexed,
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 9, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/jones-brainimaging.pdf; see, e.g., Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with
fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, 876 (2008).
49. Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Juvenile
Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 510 (2009).
50. Id.
51. For a discussion of the group to individual inference problem, see David L. Faigman et
al., Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 417
(2014).
52. Many others have similarly recognized the need for caution in light of these limitations.
Jay Aronson, for instance, has observed that “[w]hile it is indeed possible that teens who commit
crimes are on average biologically different from those who do not, the current state of
neuroscience . . . leaves us in no position to make a claim one way or the other” and thus
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equally to legislative use of neuroscience? I spend the remainder of
the Article exploring this question, looking first at how brain science
is so far been used in state legislatures.
III. BRAIN SCIENCE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN STATE LEGISLATURES
This part explores how brain science has been used in the
development of juvenile justice legislation.53 I suggest that brain
science is a part of the juvenile justice policy dialogue, but it is
primarily a part of one side of that dialogue—the side that argues for
lower mandatory sentences and against juvenile transfer to adult
courts. In addition, I suggest that the rhetoric used by advocacy
groups is more categorical than the measured approach suggested by
the underlying research.
Legislative activity in the arena of juvenile justice was well
underway before the Supreme Court’s recent string of decisions
involving brain science.54 As historians of juvenile justice in
America have noted, it was legislative activity (influenced in various
and interrelated ways by citizen opinion, legal developments, and
media coverage) that led to the juvenile justice system that reformers
now seek to change.55 Legislative action since 2001 shows the
effects of current reformers’ efforts.56
“neuroscience does not (at least at present) offer a way out of the vexing problems at the heart of
juvenile justice.” Aronson, supra note 43, at 930; see also Aronson, supra note 35, at 134 (“[T]he
actual usefulness of brain imaging in the legal system is the subject of much debate.”).
53. This part focuses on state legislatures, but the U.S. Congress has also considered
neuroscience evidence when deliberating about juvenile justice. See, e.g., Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act: Overview and Perspectives: Before the Healthy Family & Cmtys.
Subcomm., U.S. H.R. Educ. & Labor Comm., and the Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec.
Subcomm., and the U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 25 (2007) (testimony of Hon. Paul
Lawrence, Goffstown Dist. Court, N.H. State Juvenile Justice Advisory Grp.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/36466.pdf.
54. Indicative of the importance of legislation for juvenile justice, the MacArthur
Foundation funded a program to allow the National Conference of State Legislatures to track
legislative activity. See Juvenile Justice Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/justice/ncsls-juvenile-justice-bill-tracking-database.aspx (last
updated Dec. 18, 2012); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME,
JUVENILE JUSTICE 154–227 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) (describing the history of juvenile
justice in America).
55. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING
JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT
RISK: A PLEA FOR PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2011).
56. SARAH ALICE BROWN, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, TRENDS IN
JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2001–2011, at 6 (2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org
/documents/cj/trendsinjuvenilejustice.pdf.
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While courts may have drawn the bulk of scholarly neurolaw
attention, “[l]egislatures are recognizing the importance of the
adolescent brain development research as well.”57 This part proceeds
by reviewing some of the advocacy efforts for legislating brain
science in juvenile justice, and some of the legislative activity
undertaken as a result.58
A. Advocating With Brain Science
Studies of legislative behavior show that interest group activity
plays a key role in determining which issues get on the legislative
agenda and how policy is crafted in those issue areas.59 In the context
of criminal justice, research suggests that interest groups play an
important role.60
Before examining legislation, therefore, it is useful to review
how some prominent interest groups are using brain science in their
advocacy for juvenile justice reform. Advocacy groups make bold
claims about the relationship between brain science and legal
reform.61 Indeed, one scholar suggests that “almost all of the major
liberal and progressive juvenile justice reform organizations in the
United States have position papers or websites devoted to the use and
effectiveness of ‘brain science’ in juvenile justice reform.”62
The National Juvenile Justice Network (NJJN) has developed a
comprehensive guide for advocates interested in using brain
57. Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 483, 495 (2009).
58. The term “result” is used here casually, not causally, as the evidence presented here does
not permit one to draw a causal link between the use of brain science by the advocacy groups and
the resulting legislation. Moreover, the evidence offered here is intended to be illustrative, not
comprehensive. For additional discussion of whether the use of brain science is effective in
bringing about the reforms intended by the advocates who use it, see Alexandra Cox, Brain
Science and Juvenile Justice: Questions for Policy and Practice, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK 123 (Wesley T. Church II et al. eds., 2013).
59. Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States, in POLITICS IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 100, 113–14 (Virginia Gray & Russell L. Hanson eds., CQ Press 8th ed.
2004).
60. LISA MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY AND THE POLITICS OF
CRIME CONTROL (2008); Scott R. Hechinger, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Antidote to
Congress’s One-Way Criminal Law Ratchet?, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 408, 410
(2011) (“Advocates for juvenile justice have worked for years to enact legislative change at the
state level . . . .”).
61. Part IV argues that such claims are problematic because they fail to properly address the
limitations of the science and because they (apparently) fail to see how such a strategy could
ultimately backfire if the neuroscience of individual differences continues to make rapid progress.
62. Cox, supra note 58, at 128.
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science.63 The guide is unique because it addresses head-on the
concern that “[m]any researchers argue that . . . there is much more
that we do not yet know . . . [a]nd thus, it is just too early to start
using this research to inform policy.”64 The NJJN responds that
“juvenile justice advocates have found that this research is nothing
short of compelling” because the brain science “opens the doors to
legislators’ offices who never before thought about progressive
juvenile justice reform” and because the science “gives advocates
and lawyers working on behalf of juveniles scientific proof for their
claims . . . .”65 In short, NJJN is arguing that the science is good
enough for persuasive purposes within the political sphere.
Advocates have used, or promoted the use of, brain science to
support many arguments over the past few years.66 In 2009, the
Washington Coalition for the Just Treatment of Youth produced a
report focused directly on policy implications of neuroscience and
argued that “[d]evelopments in scientific and psychosocial research
in recent years suggest that Washington laws that allow for the trial,
sentencing, and incarceration of youth in the adult system should be
reexamined.”67
In Connecticut, the Connecticut Juvenile Justice Alliance
testified before the Connecticut Judiciary Committee in favor of a

63. See NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, USING ADOLESCENT BRAIN RESEARCH TO
INFORM POLICY: A GUIDE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCATES (2012), available at
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Brain-Development-Policy-Paper_Updated_FINAL-9
-27-12.pdf. The NJJN “enhances the capacity of juvenile justice coalitions and organizations in
33 states to press for state and federal laws, policies and practices that are fair, equitable and
developmentally appropriate for all children, youth and families involved in, or at risk of
becoming involved in, the justice system.” Our Work, NAT’L JUV. JUST. NETWORK,
http://www.njjn.org/our-work/our-work (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).
64. NAT’L JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK, supra note 63, at 3.
65. Id. The NJNN also argues that, “perhaps even more importantly, brain development
research provides heretofore reluctant legislators from ‘tough-on-crime’ districts a basis for a
shift from punishment of juveniles to rehabilitation.” Id.
66. See Cox, supra note 58, at 128 (noting that ”advocates have cited neuroscientific
research about the adolescent brain to make a case for the lesser punishment of young people
charged with crimes”); Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of Youth:
Implications for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 428, 433 (2011)
(“[M]any youth advocates are offering neuroscience, sometimes by itself and sometimes along
with behavioral and social science, to show that youth are not yet fully formed, cognitively and
psychosocially, relative to adults.”).
67. WASH. COAL. FOR THE JUST TREATMENT OF YOUTH, A REEXAMINATION OF YOUTH
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS OF
NEW FINDINGS ABOUT JUVENILE RECIDIVISM AND ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT 5
(2009), available at http://www.columbialegal.org/files/JLWOP_cls.pdf.
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bill that would allow juveniles with life sentences an opportunity for
parole.68 The Alliance testified that “[s]cience now has proof that a
teenager’s brain is still developing until the age of 25” and that
“[b]rain science tells us that children have a greater capacity for
change than adults.”69 Connecticut Voices for Children made a
similar point, as it argued that “[t]his information about teenage brain
development ought to have significant impact on how we view
young people’s culpability, competency, and potential for
rehabilitation, and therefore how the courts try and sentence
juveniles.”70
The translation of “lab neuroscience” (what the published
research finds) into “lobbyist neuroscience” (what the lobbyists say
the research finds) involves a rhetorical reframing of the science.71
For instance, the Illinois Coalition for the Fair Sentencing of
Children uses a subheading of “The Hard Science of Culpability”
when it introduces the connection between brain science and juvenile
justice reform.72 Act 4 Juvenile Justice similarly suggests that
“[h]ard science demonstrates that teenagers and young adults are not

68. In Favor of Raised Bill 417, An Act Concerning Juvenile Matters and Permanent
Guardianship and H.B. 5546 An Act Concerning Sentence Modification for Juveniles: Before the
Judiciary Comm., 2012 General Assemb. (Conn. 2012) (testimony of Abby Anderson, Dir. of the
Conn. Juvenile Justice Alliance), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/Tmy/2012SB
-00417-R000323-Abby%20Anderson-%20CT%20Juvenile%20Justice%20Alliance%20TMY.pdf.
69. Id.
70. Testimony in Support of H.B. 5546: An Act Concerning Sentence Modification for
Juveniles; and S.B. 417: An Act Concerning Juvenile Matters and Permanent Guardianship:
Before the Judiciary Comm., 2012 General Assemb. (Conn. 2012) (testimony on behalf of
Connecticut Voices for Children), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/JUDdata/Tmy
/2012HB-05546-R000323-Alexandra%20Dufresne%20&%20Sarah%20Esty%20CT%20Voices
%20for%20Children-TMY.PDF.
71. Terry Maroney recognized the danger of this type of translation:
The realities of advocacy, in which nuance and complexity are difficult to convey
without compromising effectiveness, incentivize advocates to oversimplify. . . . It may
be tempting to regard the frequently flattened or even distorted portrayal of
neuroscience as harmless if it appears to come “close enough” to the truth for legal, not
laboratory, purposes. This temptation must be resisted.
Maroney, supra note 34, at 276–78.
72. ILL. COAL. FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF CHILDREN, CATEGORICALLY LESS CULPABLE
16 (2008) (emphasis added), available at http://webcast-law.uchicago.edu/pdfs/00544_Juvenile
_Justice_Book_3_10.pdf (“[D]octors have now provided a medical reason for the various
behaviors identified by psychologists as typical in adolescents: they are not capable of behaving
like adults because they lack the developed brain structure to do so.”).
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fully mature in their judgment, problem-solving and decision-making
capacities.”73
The brain-behavior relationship is presented as absolute in the
advocate’s formulation. For example, the National Juvenile Defender
Center tells juvenile defenders that the “[c]urrent brain development
research posits that youth are categorically less culpable than the
average adult offender.”74
B. How Neuroscience Has Already Influenced
Juvenile Justice Policy
Likely in part due to the advocacy efforts just discussed, state
legislatures have already considered, and even enacted, a number of
pieces of juvenile justice that acknowledge brain science.75 This
section offers a selective review of that legislation, focusing most on
some developments in New York.
In California in 2010, State Senator Leland Yee (who holds a
Ph.D. in child psychology)76 proposed a bill to allow those who were
convicted before the age of eighteen to life sentences to file a petition
for a review of their case.77 Although the 2010 efforts ultimately

73. ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, ADOLESCENT BRAIN DEVELOPMENT & JUVENILE JUSTICE
FACT SHEET (emphasis added), available at http://www.act4jj.org/media/factsheets/factsheet
_12.pdf.
74. ROBIN WALKER STERLING, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., ROLE OF JUVENILE
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DELINQUENCY COURT 10 (2009) (emphasis added). The report also
suggests that neuroscience research “has gained wide acceptance, as indicated most recently by
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).” Id. There
are also points at which advocates slightly overstate their claims. For instance, a 2010 report
submitted to the New York legislature wrote that the science of adolescent brain development is
“well-grounded enough that it has been accepted both by the Supreme Court which relied heavily
on adolescent brain development research when ruling the juvenile death penalty
unconstitutional.” N.Y. STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GRP., TOUGH ON CRIME:
PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY BY DOING WHAT WORKS 10 (2010), available at
www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/2010-juvenile-justice-annual-report.pdf. In fact,
the Roper decision itself made no mention of the brain science, and neither Graham nor Miller
relied heavily on the neuroscience.
75. At least one scholar believes that momentum for some of the recent reform in New York
is based on recent “neurological brain imaging studies proving that the older adolescent’s brain
has not fully matured,” as well as a “decreas[e] [in] adolescent crime rate.” Merril Sobie, Raising
the Age: New York’s Archaic Age of Criminal Responsibility, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:45 AM),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202569840581&Raising_the_Age
_New_Yorks_Archaic_Age_of_Criminal_Responsibility&slreturn=20120907144817.
76. Biography of Senator Leland Yee, CAL. STATE SENATE, http://sd08.senate.ca.gov
/biography (last visited Jan. 21, 2012).
77. Soung, supra note 66, at 428.
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failed to garner support in both chambers,78 Yee subsequently
proposed Senate Bill 9, “[t]he Fair Sentencing for Youth Act.”79 This
bill found more support, and Governor Jerry Brown signed it into
law in September 2012.80
In proposing the law in 2011, Senator Yee argued that, among
other things, California’s existing law “ignore[d] neuroscience and
well-accepted understandings of adolescent development” and that
“even those who commit serious crimes should have the opportunity
to prove they have matured and changed.”81 In promoting the bill,
Senator Yee argued that “[b]rain maturation continues well through
adolescence,’” and that the bill thus “‘rightfully provides final
judgment of youth offenders when they are well into
adulthood . . . .”82 This translation of neuroscience into policy can be
seen in other juvenile statutory proposals as well.
In 2008, the State of Washington’s Sentencing Guidelines
Commission made a recommendation that would reduce the
likelihood of transfer for juveniles under age fifteen.83 The first
rationale for this recommendation was that “scientific research
regarding juvenile brain development has shown that juveniles are
both less culpable than adults for their action and more amenable to
rehabilitation than adults.”84
In New Mexico, brain science has been integrated into
delinquency proceedings, as one of the factors judges must consider

78. Yee: California Assembly Failed Our Kids, CAL. STATE SENATE (Aug. 30, 2010),
http://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2010-08-30-yee-california-assembly-failed-our-kids
79. S. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); see Bill List, LEGIS. COUNS. CAL.,
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill_number=sb_9&sess=PREV&house=S&author
=yee (last updated Nov. 21, 2012).
SENTENCING
FOR
YOUTH,
80. Governor
Brown
Signs
SB
9!,
FAIR
http://www.fairsentencingforyouth.org/2012/09/governor-brown-signs-sb-9/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2012).
81. LONI HANCOCK, S. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS, S. 9, 2012 Leg., Reg.
Sess., at J (Cal. 2011), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_0001
-0050/sb_9_cfa_20110404_112049_sen_comm.html.
82. Child Advocates Urge Governor to Sign SB 9—Fair Sentencing for Youth Act, CAL. ST.
SENATE (Sept. 10, 2012), http://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2012-09-10-marian-wright-edelman
-child-advocates-urge-governor-sign-sb-9-fair-sentencing-youth- (internal quotation marks
omitted).
83. Memorandum from Jean Soliz-Conklin, Exec. Dir. of Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n
Staff, State of Wash., to Sentencing Guidelines Comm’n, State of Wash. 1 (Dec. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.ofm.wa.gov/sgc/meetings/2008/12/SGCmeeting_20081212_ExhibitA
.pdf.
84. Id.
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is the child’s brain development.85 In Wisconsin in 2010, the
Assembly Committee on Corrections and the Courts heard testimony
about adolescent brain science during a hearing on juvenile
transfer.86 In Nevada, the Legislative Committee on Child Welfare
and Juvenile Justice heard brain science testimony during its April
2012 meeting.87
Of course, just because brain science is mentioned does not
mean it will be persuasive. For instance, in Texas, while the
Chairman of the Texas House Corrections Committee reported that
“[t]he brain development studies have been part of the discussion and
will continue to be,” he also emphasized that:
the main issue we’re dealing with is providing proper
security. . . . If you’re getting assaulted by a youth, it
doesn’t make much difference to you whether his brain will
not fully develop until he’s 25. We have to have a safe
environment in these (lockups) to have any success at
programming and rehabilitation.88
Moreover, brain science may cut in different directions. In
Nebraska, for instance, legislators debated whether juveniles should
have an expanded right to contract. One legislator was concerned
that those under age eighteen would not understand contracts well
enough, arguing that “[t]heir brains do not allow them to process [the
details of contracting].”89
The Texas and Nebraska anecdotes are, at present, the exception
that proves the rule—for the most part, brain science is being
introduced to promote reduced sentences and to reduce transfer to
criminal courts. An excellent illustration is found in New York.
85. CORINNE WOLFE, UNIV. OF N.M. SCH. OF LAW, NEW MEXICO JUVENILE JUSTICE
HANDBOOK 3–2 (2011) (citing N. M. STAT. § 32A-2-20(C)(5) (2009)).
86. Committee Hears Testimony on Bill to Return Most 17-Year-Olds to Juvenile Justice
System, ST. B. WIS. (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=News
&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=91973.
87. LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON CHILD WELFARE & JUVENILE JUSTICE, NEV. LEGISLATURE,
SUMMARY MINUTES AND ACTION REPORT, 76th Sess., at 24–25 (2012), available at
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Interim/76th2011/Minutes/ChildWelfare//IM-ChildWelfare-040412
-10548.pdf.
88. Mike Ward, Report on Adolescent Brains Hits Nerve in Criminal Justice Debate,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Aug. 6, 2012, 8:58 PM), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state
-regional-govt-politics/report-on-adolescent-brains-hits-nerve-in-criminal/nRNKT/.
89. Neb. Legislature, Senators Advance Bill That Would Add Rights for Some Youth,
UNICAMERAL UPDATE, Jan. 25–29, 2010, at 10, available at http://www.nebraskalegislature.gov
/pdf/update/Jan25-29_2010.pdf.
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New York is one of two states that prosecutes sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds as adults.90 In 2011, New York State Chief
Judge Jonathan Lippman proposed a new plan that would send most
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders to family courts instead of
adult criminal courts.91 In making his pitch, which led to the start of
pilot initiatives in nine New York counties,92 Judge Lippman
explicitly referred to brain science: “[W]e know based on scientific
research that adolescents, even older adolescents, are different than
adults. In particular, their brains are not fully matured, and this limits
their ability to make reasoned judgments and engage in the kind of
thinking that weighs risks and consequences.”93
Lippman built his case on the Supreme Court’s reference to the
behavioral and brain science, noting that:
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
validity of the science of adolescent brain development in
concluding that different penalties are appropriate for
juveniles who commit serious crimes. In 2005, in Roper v
Simmons, the Court outlawed the death penalty for crimes
committed by persons under 18. Last year, in Graham v
Florida, the Court outlawed life without parole for juveniles
in non-homicide cases. The Court made clear in Roper that
young offenders are not to be absolved of responsibility or
punishment for their actions, but rather that they need to be
treated differently from older criminals because their
transgressions are not as “morally reprehensible as that of
an adult.”94
The state legislature considered two bills in 2012 related to
Lippman’s proposal.95
90. North Carolina is the other state. Judith S. Kaye, A “New Beginning” for Adolescents in
Our Criminal Justice System, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 839, 843 (2009).
91. Jonathan Lippman, Address to the Citizens Crime Commission (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.nycrimecommission.org/pdfs/Lippman110921.pdf. Under the proposed ban, the most
violent juveniles would continue to be prosecuted as adults. Mosi Secret, New York Judge Seeks
New System for Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21
/nyregion/new-yorks-chief-judge-seeks-new-system-for-juvenile-defendants.html.
92. Adolescent Diversion Program: The Court System Pilots a New Approach to Young
Offenders, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.courtinnovation.org
/research/adolescent-diversion-program-court-system-pilots-new-approach-young-offenders
[hereinafter Adolescent Diversion Program].
93. See Lippman, supra note 91, at 4.
94. Id. at 5.
95. A.B. A9424, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012).
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Both bills made explicit reference to brain science. The first
(which would raise the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen and
expand family court jurisdiction) noted that “[r]esearch has shown
that children’s brains do not fully develop until after the age of
eighteen, and youths who engage in criminal conduct often do not
have the same level of understanding of their actions as adults.”96
The related bill, which addressed similar concerns, argued that
“[m]odern behavioral neuroscience confirms that the brains of
teenagers are not yet mature . . . [and it] is now understood that
teenage offenders should be treated differently from older
criminals . . . .”97 In addition, family court judges in the pilot
diversion programs received training that included an introduction to
brain science.98
Judge Lippman’s efforts have also had ripple effects on other
levels of government. The New York City Council’s Committee of
Juvenile Justice99 adopted a resolution in 2011 in support of raising
the age of criminal responsibility for nonviolent offenses to
eighteen.100 The hearing and committee notes are useful sources in
examining the rhetoric of neuroscience in this policy discussion.
Multiple individuals who testified before the committee referred
to the science of adolescent development.101 The Correctional

96. Id.
97. S.B. 7394, 2012 Leg., 235th Sess. (N.Y. 2012), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us
/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S07394&term=2011&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Votes=Y&Memo=Y
&Text=Y.
98. See Adolescent Diversion Program, supra note 92 (“Under the initiative, judges hearing
cases involving 16 and 17 year olds receive training in topics such as adolescent brain
development, trauma, substance abuse, mental health, co-occurring disorders, education, and
family issues.”).
99. The New York City Council Committee of Juvenile Justice is a sub-committee within
the city council. The committee holds regular meetings, rules on and drafts reports regarding
juvenile justice resolutions to be voted upon. See Committee on Juvenile Justice, N.Y. CITY
COUNCIL (Oct. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/DepartmentDetail.aspx?ID=
7044&GUID=E5F9693D-1F9C-45DD-919F-74503033A755&Search=.
100. N.Y.C. Council Res. 1067-2011, Leg. Sess. 2805 (N.Y. 2011), available at
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1024411&GUID
=44E57E53-1EB4-48C8-9453-D4C0DF3E908C&Title=Legislation+Text (“Resolution
supporting New York State Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman’s call on the New York State
Legislature to pass and the Governor to sign legislation raising the age of criminal responsibility
for nonviolent offenses to 18 and permit the cases of 16 and 17 year-olds charged with such
offenses to be adjudicated in the Family Court rather than the adult criminal justice system.”).
101. Id. In addition to the Correctional Association of New York, Steven Banks of The Legal
Aid Society Juvenile Rights Practice mentioned brain science. Testimony Before the Comm. on
Juvenile Justice on Res. No. 1067-2011, 2012 N.Y.C. Council (N.Y. 2011) (testimony of Steven
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Association of New York, for instance, “strongly believes in the
scientific research and analysis cited by [Judge Lippman] as grounds
for his proposal.”102 The Correctional Association cited the work of
neuroscientist Ruben Gur, as well as Roper and Graham, in building
its case on “the significant body of rigorous scientific
research . . . .”103 The Committee also considered a Campaign for
Youth Justice publication that discussed why “Teen Brains Are Not
Fully Developed.”104
The testimony heard by the Committee seems to have influenced
its final report, which stated that “[a] growing body of science
research shows that the adolescent brain is not as fully developed as
the adult brain.”105 In the Resolution itself, the Committee found that
“scientific studies of the adolescent mind have shown that sixteen
and seventeen year-olds lack the maturity and judgment to
understand the legal consequences of their actions,” and thus the
Council supported Judge Lippman’s proposal.106
C. Unknown Effect of Neuroscience on Policy Outcomes
The anecdotal evidence just reviewed shows that brain science is
a part of current juvenile justice debate in legislative circles. But it is
not known whether discussion of juvenile justice reform is more
frequent, more prominent, or more persuasive because of brain
science.107 Moreover, the effect of brain science on policy outcomes

Banks, Attorney-in-Chief, The Legal Aid Society), available at http://www.legal-aid.org/media
/151080/testimony110111.pdf.
102. Testimony Before the N.Y.C. Council on Resolution 1067-2011, 2012 N.Y.C. Council
(N.Y. 2011) (testimony of Gabrielle Prisco, Dir., Juvenile Justice Project, The Correctional
Assoc. of N.Y.), available at www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/NY_GPtestimony
_JJP_2011.doc.
103. Id.
104. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010:
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2011), available at
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf.
105. COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, CITY COUNCIL OF N.Y.C., REPORT FOR VOICE-VOTE
RES. NO. 1067, at 53 (2012), available at http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail
.aspx?ID=986416&GUID=62F4A0D5-6EC7-490D-A8CD-CAC0E9DFA490 (click on the
hyperlink titled “Committee Report 11/28/11”).
106. N.Y.C. Council Res. 1067-2011, Leg. Sess. 2805 (N.Y. 2011), available at http://legistar
.council.nyc.gov/ViewReport.ashx?M=R&N=Text&GID=61&ID=1024411&GUID=44E57E531EB4-48C8-9453-D4C0DF3E908C&Title=Legislation+Text.
107. For a critique that this emphasis is misplaced, see Cox, supra note 58.
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also remains a mystery. What is known is that the future of juvenile
justice is now going to be shaped in the shadow of Miller.108
IV. LEGISLATING BRAIN SCIENCE POST-MILLER
The Court’s decision in Miller poses a number of problems for
the twenty-six states that impose a mandatory life sentence for
juvenile murderers.109 First, state courts must determine what, if
anything, to do about the more than 2,500 individuals already serving
juvenile life sentences.110 One especially important debate is whether
Miller should be apply retroactively to those individuals.111 Second,
courts in affected states must also figure out how to handle ongoing
cases in which a juvenile has been charged with first-degree
murder.112 Third, legislatures must figure out how to fix the now
unconstitutional state statutes. The “fix” does not have to necessarily
be an overhaul of the system, but “could be as simple as changing a
few words in an existing statute.”113
At the time of this writing, it is still too early to know exactly
what the full effects of Miller will be. But it seems a good bet that
whatever happens, brain science will be used by advocates in the
promotion of their preferred reform policies. Thus, I consider in this
part post-Miller legislative action in selected states and the normative
framework we should employ for evaluating the use of neuroscience
in those contexts.

108. See infra Part IV.
109. Maggie Clark, States Reconsider Juvenile Life Sentences, STATELINE (July 27, 2012),
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/states-reconsider-juvenile-life-sentences
-85899407729.
110. Paul Elias, Life Sentences for Juveniles: Should 2,500 Serving Life Without Parole Be
Released?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/08/19/life-sentences-for-juveni_n_1806259.html. Courts (or legislatures) must also
determine what will constitute a de facto life sentence. For instance, is an 80-year sentence
effectively a life sentence?
111. Sean Craig, Juvenile Life Without Parole Post-Miller: The Long, Treacherous Road
Towards A Categorical Rule, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 408 n.224 (2013) (“[S]tate courts are
split over whether Miller should means anything for prisoners still serving mandatory juvenile
LWOP sentences. Despite the fact that the Miller Court applied its holding to Kuntrell Jackson's
collateral challenge, state courts disagree about the decision's general retroactivity.”).
112. This issue arose in Florida in the case of Cristian Fernandez. See Jim Schoettler,
Fernandez Ruling Could Have Statewide Impact, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug. 31, 2012, at B-5.
113. Clark, supra note 109.
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A. Legislation Post-Miller
This section reviews selected legislation (through October 2012)
in the wake of Miller.114 In October 2012, the Wyoming Joint
Judiciary Interim Committee drafted a new juvenile sentencing
bill.115 The bill would provide relief to juveniles convicted of murder
in the first degree by punishing them not with mandatory life, but
with “imprisonment for a term of not less than twenty-five years, or
for life, or life imprisonment without parole.”116 The legislation
further provided that “[b]efore imposing a sentence . . . the
sentencing court shall hold a hearing at which the defendant and the
state may present evidence of the defendant’s age, maturity,
intelligence, relative culpability, potential for rehabilitation, ability to
appreciate risks and consequences and any other matter relative to
the sentencing decision.”117 The statute translates the Miller decision
into new policy, providing guidance on the factors that a judge
should consider in determining the juvenile’s sentence.
In Iowa, Governor Terry Branstad commuted the life-withoutpossibility-of-parole sentences of thirty-eight juveniles to life with
the possibility of parole after sixty years.118 Discussing the
commutations, Governor Branstad said that “[j]ustice is a balance
and these commutations ensure that justice is balanced with

114. Much has happened since the October 2012 symposium. For updates, see Cara H.
Drinan, Misconstruing Graham & Miller, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 785 (2014); Anne Teigen, 2013
Juvenile Justice State Legislation, (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/2013-juvenile-justice-state-legislation.aspx, Natl. Conf. State Legislatures.
115. JOINT JUDICIARY INTERIM COMM., DRAFT OF A BILL OF AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMES
AND OFFENSES; PROVIDING FOR A SENTENCING HEARING FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER; PROVIDING FOR PAROLE ELIGIBILITY FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS SENTENCED TO LIFE; AND PROVIDING FOR AN EFFECTIVE DATE, S. 62-202, 2013
Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012). It appears that the legislation “won’t apply to the eight inmates already
serving life from crimes they committed as juveniles. Those inmates would still need to persuade
a judge to reduce their sentence, according to lawyers who are familiar with the legislation.”
Joshua Wolfson, Fate of Juvenile Life Sentences Would Rest with Judges, BILLINGS GAZETTE
Nov. 5, 2012, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/fate-of-juvenile-lifesentences-would-rest-with-judges/article_36e69334-0b20-5480-9ea6-23562611efc5.html
#ixzz2C1pquqMm.
116. JOINT JUDICIARY INTERIM COMM., supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Iowa Terry Branstad, Branstad Moves to
Prevent the Release of Dangerous Murderers in Light of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision
(July 16, 2012),
https://governor.iowa.gov/2012/07/branstad-moves-to-prevent-the-release-of
-dangerous-murderers-in-light-of-recent-u-s-supreme-court-decision/.
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punishment for those vicious crimes and taking into account public
safety.”119
Finally, in Florida the post-Miller efforts to come will almost
certainly be merged with the post-Graham efforts that have sputtered
in the legislature. The Florida legislature responded to the Supreme
Court’s decision with a “Graham Compliance Act,” first introduced
in both the state house and state senate in 2010, and later introduced
(in modified form) in subsequent years.120 Through 2011, the
legislature had not yet enacted such legislation,121 and as of the time
of this writing in 2012, the legislature had not acted.122
This inaction is problematic, as Graham v. Florida requires that
states must provide “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for
juveniles sentenced to life in prison.123 But the Court did not fully
define what it meant by this requirement, and thus the “legal and
practical question remains—what amounts to a ‘meaningful
opportunity for release’?”124 While courts will answer this question
through re-sentencing individual inmates, legislatures, too, will play
a role in Graham compliance when state sentencing laws are deemed
inconsistent with the Graham mandate.125
119. Id. Since the original writing of this Article, Branstad’s commutations have not all been
upheld as constitutional. See State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa 2013).
120. H.B. 29, 2011 H.R., 113th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011); S.B. 160, 2011 S., 113th Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2011). Similar bills were re-introduced in subsequent years. See S.B. 212, 2012 S., 114th
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012); H.B. 5, 2012 H.R., 114th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012).
121. Ilona P. Vila, Supporting the Florida Legal Community’s Response to Graham v.
Florida, 17 BARRY L. REV. 153, 155 (2011) (“In 2010 and 2011, neither the Florida Governor's
Office nor the Florida Legislature took action in response to the Graham opinion, leaving the
courts to resentence each Graham individual entitled to relief.”).
122. Whether this failure to act on the proposed legislation is a good thing depends on one’s
view of the legislation. For instance, requiring at least twenty-five years behind bars before parole
consideration struck at least some as problematic. By being in prison for at least twenty-five
years, a juvenile offender “could arguably attain cognitive, social, and educational maturity long
before expiration of twenty-five years.” Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release
Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 39 (2011).
123. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). Responding to Graham might involve
significant system redesign, as “[t]o truly implement Graham, legislatures need to revise the
considerations parole commissions use to mandate review to make the considerations based on
maturity and rehabilitation, as mandated by the Supreme Court.” Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila,
What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize
Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 310, 328 (2012). Gerard Glynn and Ilona
Vila have suggested a model statute that legislatures could adopt to meet the Graham mandate.
124. Green, supra note 122, at 1.
125. Leanne Palmer, Juvenile Sentencing in the Wake of Graham v. Florida: A Look into
Uncharted Territory, 17 BARRY L. REV. 133, 148 (explaining that legislatures must act as well
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Turning to Pennsylvania, Miller was decided as Pennsylvania
state legislators were already working on a juvenile justice reform
bill to continue addressing concerns stemming from a highly
publicized “Kids for Cash” scandal that was uncovered in Luzerne
County by the Juvenile Law Center.126 The Kids for Cash program
involved a Luzerne County judge who was found guilty of taking
more than $1 million in bribes in exchange for sending children in
the juvenile system to for-profit juvenile detention centers.127
Faced with the Miller dilemma discussed above, Pennsylvania’s
legislators amended the bill to change mandatory sentencing
requirements for juveniles.128 The new bill amended Pennsylvania’s
statutes such that those convicted of first-degree murder,129 who were
older than fifteen but younger than eighteen at the time of the
offense, would receive life in prison without parole or a minimum
thirty-five-year sentence,130 and those younger than fifteen at the
time of the crime would receive life without parole or at least twentyfive years.131 Those convicted of second-degree murder who were
older than fifteen but younger than eighteen at the time of the offense
would receive a minimum thirty-year sentence, and those younger
than fifteen at the time of the crime would receive at least twenty
years. Miller held that state sentencing schemes could not mandate

“because many laws, such as Florida’s law abolishing parole, can be contradictory to Graham’s
holding”).
126. Luzerne Kids-for-Cash Scandal, JUV. L. CENTER, http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives
/promoting-fairness-courts/luzerne-kids-cash-scandal (last updated Feb. 2012); WILLIAM
ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH (2012).
127. Sarah Cassi, Review of Luzerne County ‘Kids for Cash’ Scandal Complete, Thousands of
Convictions Dismissed, EXPRESS-TIMES (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com
/breaking-news/index.ssf/2012/01/kids_for_cash_scandal_judicial.html.
128. Greenleaf’s Bills Signed into Law on Criminal Justice Reform, Auto Theft Prevention,
and Juvenile Justice, PENN. SENATE REPUBLICANS (Oct. 25, 2012), http://pasenategop.com
/news/2012/1012/greenleaf-102512.htm (“The legislation was amended in the House to comply
with the recent U.S. Supreme Court Ruling that mandatory sentencing of juveniles to life without
parole is unconstitutional.”). The legislation does not apply retroactively. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court will decide how to handle the cases of those juveniles who were sentenced
(previous to Miller) to mandatory life without parole for murder. See Dana DiFilippo, Pa.’s High
Court Grapples with Federal Decision on Sentencing Juveniles, PHILLY.COM (Sept. 13, 2012),
http://articles.philly.com/2012-09-13/news/33818431_1_mandatory-life-without-parole-sentences
-juvenile-lifers-lengthy-sentences.
129. This includes “first degree murder of an unborn child or of murder of a law enforcement
officer of the first degree.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a) (2012).
130. Sentence of persons under the age of eighteen for murder, murder of an unborn child and
murder of a law enforcement officer. Id. § 1102.1(a)(1).
131. Id. § 11.021(a)(2).
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life without parole for homicide offenders; the Court did not go so
far as to prohibit such sentences altogether. The Pennsylvania
legislation thus solves the problem by keeping life as an option, but
providing an alternative as well.
The bill was praised by some and criticized by others. The
Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association, for instance, applauded
the passage of the bill.132 The bill also found support from the
Editorial Board of the Altoona Mirror newspaper.133 But the bill
generated strong resistance from advocacy groups and grassroots
organizations. Human Rights Watch wrote to Governor Corbett
arguing that the bill was “contrary to the spirit of [Miller] and would
codify excessive sentences for children that are inconsistent with
international human rights law to which all US states are bound.”134
Similarly, the grassroots campaign Decarcerate PA argued that
the bill did “not honor the spirit of the US Supreme Court decision”
and was “rushed through the General Assembly without sufficient
time for debate and consideration or public input.”135 They organized
a letter-writing and phone campaign to voice opposition to elected
leaders.136
Salient to this Article’s discussion of brain science, the
executive director of the Pennsylvania Prison Society argued that the
bill “fail[ed] to take into account relevant findings from neuroscience
research” and that “[i]n crafting our laws, legislators should be
considering recent findings about the development of the human
brain and how it does not reach full functioning until the mid-20s.”137
The Juvenile Law Center also argued that the bill was not “consistent

132. Press Release, Pa. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n, District Attorneys Praise PA Legislature for End of
Session Criminal Justice Focus (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.pdaa.org/index.php?option=com
_content&view=article&id=154:district-attorneys-praise-pa-legislature-for-end-of-session
-criminal-justice-focus&catid=48:press-pdaa&Itemid=64.
133. Editorial, Bill Finds a Proper Balance, ALTOONA MIRROR (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.altoonamirror.com/page/content.detail/id/565393/Bill-finds-a-proper-balance.html
?nav=728.
134. Letter from Antonio Ginatta, U.S. Program Advocacy Dir., Human Rights Watch, to
Tom Corbett, Governor of Pa. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19
/uspennsylvania-dont-codify-excessive-sentences-children.
135. Urgent: Voice Your Opposition to SB 850 Now!, DECARCERATE PA, http://decarceratepa
.info/calendar/urgent-voice-your-opposition-sb-850-now (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
136. Id.
137. William DiMascio, Reconsider Treating the Violent with Violence, CENTRE DAILY
TIMES
(Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.centredaily.com/2012/10/17/3372215/william-dimascio
-reconsider-treating.html.
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with the latest knowledge of adolescent development” and that “the
line-drawing proposed by SB 850 is arbitrary, lacking any scientific
foundation.”138 Despite this and other opposition, the revised bill was
passed by the House on October 16, 2012, passed through a Senate
Concurrence Vote the following day, and signed into law by
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett on October 25, 2012.139
B. Evaluating the Use of Brain Science
We know that state legislatures are playing an important role
alongside courts in shaping juvenile justice policy post-Miller, and
we know that often those legislative debates include reference to
brain science.140 The question I consider here is: by what normative
criteria should we evaluate this use—and legislative use more
generally—of brain science.141
As noted earlier, the neurolaw literature does not provide us
with much guidance on the use of brain science in legislatures. There
are, to be sure, some notable exceptions. Political scientist Robert
Blank wrote a book in 1999 arguing that brain policy “warrants
urgent attention by policy makers, policy analysts, and informed
citizens,” and that “the political debate surrounding this emerging
knowledge about the brain and new intervention techniques promises
to be intense.”142 He followed up in 2013 with a book on neurointerventions, but neither book has found its way into the mainstream
of neurolaw conversation.143 For the most part, the recent volumes on
138. Pennsylvania Misses the Mark on Life Without Parole for Juveniles, JUV. L. CENTER
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.jlc.org/blog/pennsylvania-misses-mark-life-without-parole-juveniles.
139. SB 850—Repeals Mandatory Life Sentences for Certain Juvenile Offenders—Key Vote,
PROJECT VOTE SMART, http://votesmart.org/bill/15854/41813/repeals-mandatory-life-sentences
-for-certain-juvenile-offenders#.UJWcI4aRaSo (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
140. As legal scholars Richard Bonnie and Elizabeth Scott have observed, “[a]cross the
country, neuroscience research indicating that teenage brains differ from those of adults has been
offered in support of a broad range of policies dealing more leniently with young offenders.”
Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the
Law, 22 CURRENT DEV. IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 160 (April 2013).
141. I consider this question at greater length, and through analysis of an original dataset on
legislation making reference to brain science, in Francis X. Shen, Synapses and Social Policy:
The Legislative Politics of Neurolaw (Feb. 23, 2014) (on file with author).
142. ROBERT H. BLANK, BRAIN POLICY: HOW THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE WILL CHANGE OUR
LIVES AND OUR POLITICS 168, 172 (1999).
143. ROBERT H. BLANK, INTERVENTION IN THE BRAIN: POLITICS, POLICY, AND ETHICS
(2013). Blank’s 1999 book is cited only three times in Westlaw’s secondary sources. One
instance is his citation in Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating
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neurolaw have focused primarily on the potential courtroom
contributions of neuroscience.144
More generally, while there has been a decent amount written
about the use of science in trial courts, constitutional issues, and
administrative law,145 Faigman observed in 1999 that “[t]here have
been no general studies or assessments of the legislative use of
science.”146 There is clearly a gap to fill and a need to think critically
about science-policy interaction in the state legislative domain.
Here I reflect on one question that ought to be a part of such an
inquiry: With what normative framework should we encourage or
discourage uses of neuroscience in legislatures? Drawing on the
distinction I made earlier between “lab science” as compared to
“lobbyist science” and “legislator science”, I suggest that a useful
way to frame the issue is to think of a two-dimensional grid that
examines both (1) adherence to the core findings of the relevant
science, and (2) effectiveness in advancing pre-existing normative
policy goals. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptualization, though of
course both dimensions are continuous and not categorical.

the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 397 (2010), and the other two
citations are simply footnotes mentioning his work. There is no extended treatment of either his
1999 or his 2013 studies in the legal literature.
144. See, e.g., JOSEPH R. SIMPSON, NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE
CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM (2012).
145. In the administrative law realm, the bulk of scholarship has focused on environmental
science. See, e.g., Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: Institutional
Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983); Wendy E. Wagner, The
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995).
146. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 210 n.29 (1999). Faigman includes a chapter on
legislatures but focuses primarily on funding decisions by the U.S. Congress, as well as the
debate in the 1970s (involving Congress and the FDA) over saccharin. Since 1999, only a few
scholars have started to fill this gap, with most still overlooking legislative use of science. A
notable contribution is political scientist Ann Keller’s analysis of science in the context of federal
environmental policy. ANN CAMPBELL KELLER, SCIENCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2009).
Other studies, both before and after Keller’s, on science in the legislative process include: Denise
Scheberle, Radon and Asbestos: A Study of Agenda Setting and Causal Stories, 22 POL’Y STUD.
J. 74 (1994); SHELDON KRIMSKY, HORMONAL CHAOS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL ENDOCRINE HYPOTHESIS (2000); Stephen Zehr, Comparative Boundary
Work: U.S. Acid Rain and Global Climate Change Policy Deliberations, 32 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y
445 (2005).
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Figure 1. Tradeoff Between Adherence to Lab Science Findings
vs. Effectiveness in Advancing Policy Goals

Adherence
of
Legislator
Science to
Lab
Science

Effectiveness in
Advancing Policy Goals
(I) High Adherence
(II) High Adherence
+ Low Effectiveness
+ High Effectiveness
(III) Low Adherence
+ Low Effectiveness

(IV) Low Adherence
+ High Effectiveness

Examining the 2x2 matrix in Figure 1, neither policy advocates
nor science purists would want the outcome in quadrant III (science
that departs from the knowledge base, failing to produce the desired
policy). Similarly, both policy advocates and those who desire close
adherence to laboratory science should agree that quadrant II is a
good outcome (there are few distortions to the science and it
produces the desired policy.)
The challenge arises when we consider quadrants I and IV, and
the relationship between them.147 For purposes of discussion here,
let’s assume that a sufficiently strong departure from laboratory
science produces sufficiently good policy outcomes such that an
advocate moves from quadrant I into quadrant IV. Do we applaud or
criticize such a move?
Applause would likely be in order if fixing the justice system
were as simple as enacting a single piece of legislation, and if the
brain science (in its modified, legislator-neuroscience form) helped

147. A relevant empirical question—beyond the scope of this Article—is whether moving
from High to Low Adherence (i.e., the transformation of lab neuroscience to lobbyist and
legislator neuroscience) is necessary to be effective. For instance, neuroscientists Alexandra
Cohen and B.J. Casey’s review of relevant science “suggest[s] that, in the heat of the moment, as
in the presence of peers, potential threat, or rewards, emotional centers of the brain hijack less
mature prefrontal control circuits during adolescence, leading to poor choice behaviors.”
Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of Developmental
Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 63, 65 (2013). As a
result, they conclude that “juvenile justice policies should aim to promote rehabilitation, reduce
recidivism, and implement interventions that will bolster healthy development.” Id. Scientific
summaries such as this (which acknowledge limitations such as “neuroimaging techniques are not
currently able to aid in arguing for the guilt or innocence of a defendant in the courtroom”) might
prove useful without additional reformulation. Id.
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achieve that goal. But the world is not so simple, and neither is the
use of brain science in policymaking.
To start, overlooking the complexities of the neuroscience leaves
one vulnerable to counterattack in future policymaking using the
same body of science. For instance, many scholars have recognized
that there is a “double-edged sword” relationship between sentencing
and neuroscientific evidence. As scholars Brent Garland and Mark
Frankel observed in 2006:
while a defendant could argue for mitigation due to some
genetic propensity or neurological defect (“bad genes” or a
“bad brain” led him astray), the prosecution could make a
counterargument for aggravation, saying that the defendant
is even more dangerous because he is biologically
predisposed to commit crime and thus should be
incarcerated rather than given probation.148
Garland and Frankel argued that “[t]his mirror side to mitigation
arguments should also be included in the policy dialogue,”149 and I
concur. In the context of juvenile justice, the double-edged sword is
potentially an issue because, while children are different from adults,
they are also different from each other. At the start of the Miller
opinion, Justice Kagan emphasizes the Court’s line of cases requiring
“individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious
penalties.”150
At present, neuroscience can offer little in the way of
individualized assessment.151 But efforts are underway in
148. Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About
Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at
101, 106 (2006). The point has also been made by others. See Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged
Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentencing, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 501
(2007); Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Genetics and Responsibility: To Know the
Criminal from the Crime, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 101, 115; O. Carter
Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265
(2007).
149. Garland & Frankel, supra note 148, at 106.
150. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
151. Baird et al., supra note 35, at 121 (“[B]arring gross neurological pathology, these
[neuro]scientific advances have little or nothing to offer the individual offender.”). Bonnie &
Scott, supra note 140, at 161.
At some point, neuroscience and accompanying behavioral studies may provide age
norms against which an individual adolescent’s brain development and functioning can
be measured. However, today an expert who offers an opinion that a particular 14year-old defendant has a mature or immature brain as compared with other 14-yearolds (or “has the maturity of a 17-year-old is exceeding the limits of science. Currently,
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neuroscience to learn more about individual differences. For
instance, the “neuroscience of psychopathy is a field undergoing
rapid growth,” and perhaps that growth will one day give the legal
system more reliable ways to reliably detect psychopathy early in the
life course.152 Some scientists have already argued that “juvenile
psychopathy is fairly stable across adolescence,”153 and that the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is
overcautious in warning against diagnosing personality disorders in
youth.154 These authors make clear that they “do not believe that
these results support necessarily the use of juvenile psychopathy
scores in forensic decision-making, particularly in late childhood,”155
but nevertheless one can see how—should there be sufficient
advances in the science—such data may one day be used by
advocates in a forensic setting.
It does not strain common sense to think that at least a few of the
sixteen-year-olds in the country who commit a violent, premeditated
crime are rotten to the core, and for whatever reasons have little
chance for reform. Could neuroscience ever help us identify these
individuals (and feel comfortable with the reliability of that
identification)? Maybe not.156 But if so, such developments in “lab
neuroscience” would pose a problem for current “lobbyist
neuroscience” to the extent that lobbyists argue that neuroscience
tells us only that adolescents as a group are less deserving of
punishment, and does not tell us whether individual adolescents can
be singled out for adult-level penalties.
In addition, if a premium is placed primarily on effectiveness,
and advocates are encouraged to modify the science narrative as they
see fit, it makes it difficult to criticize those advocates on the other
the only legitimate use of adolescent brain research in individual cases is to provide
decision makers with general descriptions of brain maturation.”
152. Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl, The Psychopath Magnetized: Insights from
Brain Imaging, 16 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 52, 58 (2012).
153. Donald R. Lynam et al., The Stability of Psychopathy Across Adolescence, 21 DEV.
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1133, 1148 (2009).
154. Id. at 1148 (“The stability of psychopathic traits across childhood and adolescence are
much higher than what is implied by the characterization provided within the DSM-IV-TR.”).
155. Id.
156. Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on US Supreme Court Decisions
About Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 NAT. REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 513, 518 (2013)
(“Although there are studies that have compared juvenile offenders’ brain structure or function
with that of non-offenders, using neuroscience to predict individuals’ future behavior is a
different (and more difficult) matter.”)

LEGISLATING NEUROSCIENCE

9/9/2014 11:46 AM

1016

[Vol. 46:985

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

side of the debate. For instance, Patricia Soung has cautioned “that
reliance on neuroscience to explain adolescent cognition and
behavior is subject to misinterpretation, misuse and even abuse.”157
Specifically, Soung voices a concern about the introduction of
neuroscience-based arguments in a racialized criminal justice system.
One’s response to such misuse of the science might be, “The science
doesn’t say that!” But such a position becomes more difficult to hold
when an opponent can say something similar in reply.
C. Looking Ahead
Brain science can add productively to many legislative debates,
certainly including juvenile justice. But legislating neuroscience
should not replace legislating values. As Terry Maroney has argued,
“the real task . . . for those seeking juvenile justice reform is to
influence such beliefs, values, and inclinations directly, rather than
expect such influence to flow naturally from explanation of
neuroscience.”158
Developmental psychologist Laurence Steinberg, whose
scholarship has been cited by the Supreme Court, offers this
cautionary note: “[w]hether the revelation that the adolescent brain
may be less mature than scientists had previously thought is
ultimately a good thing, a bad thing, or a mixed blessing for young
people remains to be seen.”159 If one lives by the neuroscience sword
in making the case that children are different, then one may die by
the neuroscience sword if it swings in an unanticipated way.160
One way to avoid such unanticipated consequences is to ensure
that neuroscience is one—but not the only and not the primary—
piece of evidence considered in the policy process. Again quoting
Steinberg: “Brain science should inform the nation’s policy

157. Soung, supra note 66, at 438.
158. See Maroney, The False Promise, supra note 35, at 172.
159. Laurence Steinberg, Should the Science of Adolescent Brain Development Inform Public
Policy?, 28 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 67, 78 (2012).
160. Buss similarly concludes “that a sophisticated understanding of child development does
not, in itself, answer any legal questions. The law must determine not only what information it
relies upon, but also to what use that information should be put.” Buss, supra note 49, at 515.
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discussions when it is relevant, but society should not make policy
decisions on the basis of brain science alone.” 161
Even a neuroskeptic such as Stephen Morse is “modestly
optimistic about the near and intermediate term contributions
neuroscience can potentially make to our ordinary, traditional, folkpsychological legal system.”162 If this is true—that the future will
bring us a more relevant neuroscience, but that it is not ready yet—
then the question becomes: how do we know when we get there?
More precisely, when is a particular body of neuroscientific
research sufficiently developed to inform a particular type of legal
decision? Answering this question is at the very heart of neurolaw
and central to the relationship, present and future, of neuroscience,
law, and juvenile justice.
The problem emerges, in part, from the probabilistic nature of
neuroscientific data.163 Neuroscience is never going to give us a
definitive answer to questions such as: does a particular 17-year old
know right from wrong in the same way a particular twenty-year-old
does? But neuroscience, as with other types of evidence, might
provide information that allows us to make a better guess. Whether
the neuroscience data can do that—help us to improve our
probabilistic estimates about guilt, innocence, mental states, veracity,
and so forth—depends on how much uncertainty is included in the
neuroscience data. How much signal versus how much noise?

161. Steinberg, supra note 159, at 67, 68. See also Terry Maroney’s argument that whether it
is legislatures or courts, “adolescent brain science never should be the primary argument for
juvenile justice reform.” Maroney, supra note 34, at 258, 280. June Carbone has similarly written
that, “[w]ith attitudes toward punishment rooted in religious worldviews and corresponding to
deep divisions between left and right, scientific studies, however rigorous or persuasive are
unlikely to bridge the chasm.” June Carbone, Neuroscience and Ideology: Why Science Can
Never Supply a Complete Answer for Adolescent Immaturity, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 9, 231, 251. Carbone’s suggestion is that the information be
included in the dialogue, but should be accompanied by a discussion of the limitations of the
science. Id.
162. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance, supra note 22, at 857.
More specifically, there are four types of situations in which neuroscience may be of
assistance: (1) data indicating that the folk-psychological assumption underlying a
legal rule is incorrect; (2) data suggesting the need for new or reformed legal doctrine;
(3) evidence that helps adjudicate an individual case; and (4) data that help efficient
adjudication or administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 857.
163. This is not a problem unique to neuroscience data, but it is certainly a pronounced
problem.
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Courts have developed methods for determining when a
particular type of expert testimony is allowed in court, and
courtroom assessments focus on relevance, reliability, error rates,
and general acceptance.164 But without such barriers in the legislative
context, we are more likely to see legislator neuroscience diverge
more starkly from lab neuroscience. If the legislator is using the
science to promote a policy that accords with one’s preexisting
normative commitments, it is likely that the use of this science is
seen as commendable. But we ought to remain cautious about
allowing lobbyist and legislator neuroscience to stray too far from
the lab—even if the ultimate goal is one we agree with.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that, in addition to the use of adolescent
brain science in court, we ought to closely examine the use of such
science in state legislatures. Such examination reveals distinctions
between lab neuroscience, lobbyist neuroscience, and legislator
neuroscience. As neuroscience narratives are constructed in the
policy stream, normative questions arise. To what extent should
lobbyists and legislators adhere to the complexities and caveats of
laboratory science? How much should lawmakers simplify and
reformulate the scientific findings to achieve desired policy ends?
The Article cautions that legislator and lobbyist neuroscience that
diverges greatly from actual research findings may be problematic.

164. Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence After Daubert, 1 ANN. REV. LAW
SOC. SCI. 105 (2005).

